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On Hiroshima Day, 6 August 1985, eight South Pacific countries signed
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty at a South Pacific
Forum meeting in Rarotonga in the Cook Islands. The Rarotonga Treaty,
as it is known, is the fifth nuclear-free zone (NFZ) treaty to be established
internationally and the first since the Outer Space Treaty was signed in
1971. The only previous NFZ to be established in an inhabited region is the
Latin American NFZ (Tlatelolco Treaty).
- - -'Tne-ncalyts-htghly-s-electtvein-its--swpe--afl.d-appltt-<:frllm:-()n-fh-eone-
hand, it prohibits nuclear-weapons testing and acquisition, land-based
stationing of nuclear weapons, and nuclear-waste dumping at sea. On the
other, it contains no controls over military ship, submarine, or aircraft
transit and associated mobile deployment of nuclear weapons, either on
or over the high seas or in or over territorial waters within the zone. Nor
does it prohibit the firing of nuclear weapons from the zone, so long as the
launch platforms are not land-based and the targets do not lie within the
land territories in the zone (for a detailed analysis of the treaty's content
and limitations, see Hamel-Green 1990, 24-54).
The limited character of the zone raises several questions. First, what
were the motivations and interests that led Australia, as the initiator of the
treaty, to pursue a partial rather than more comprehensive denucleariza-
tion measure? Second, why did the South Pacific Forum island states, with
their long-standing distrust of nuclear "colonialism" generated by past and
continuing nuclear-weapon and missile-test programs in the Pacific, sup-
port such a limited measure? Third, what are the regional consequences of
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the treaty, particularly in the context of the Western powers' withholding
of recognition?
In this article, I shall argue that: (1) in advancing a limited initiative, the
Australian government was primarily concerned with protecting Austra-
lian and US nuclear interests in the region; (2) the Forum island states,
especially the Melanesian states, were extremely ambivalent about the
treaty, but were constrained from seeking a more comprehensive denucle-
arized arrangement by their economic and military dependence on Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and the United States (ANZUS states); and (3) while
the treaty has served to protect immediate key Australian and US
nuclear interests in the region, US refusal to ratify the treaty protocols (in
contrast to Soviet and Chinese endorsement) has had the paradoxical
effect of further alienating some of the island states from the nuclear
and security preoccupations of the two main ANZUS security treaty
states.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Australia's SPNFZ initiative represented the third of three waves of South
Pacific regional interest in the nuclear-free zone concept. The first
occurred in 1962-1963 against a background of US and British atmo-
spheric nuclear testing in the Pacific and the decision to locate a US sub-
marine communications base at North West Cape in Western Australia. It
involved proposals by the opposition Labour parties in Australia and New
Zealand for a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Free Zone (AHR 1962; NZLP
1963, 25). This proposal was vigorously opposed by the ruling conserva-
tive governments in both Australia and New Zealand and by the Kennedy
administration in the United States.
The second period of interest in regional denuclearization occurred in
1974-1975 when the New Zealand Rowling Labour government and the
South Pacific Forum island states gained UN support for establishing
a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. This initiative emerged in the context
of widespread regional concern about fallout from the French atmo-
spheric nuclear tests at Moruroa in French Polynesia and New Zealand
concerns about superpower naval rivalry in the Indian Ocean (Alley
1977)·
The 1975 New Zealand SPNFZ initiative, while supported strongly by
the island states at the July 1975 South Pacific Forum (NZFAR, Jul 1975, 60-
!, Z!&ii!diBI&2Ei&2lZJllOIJ]
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61) and by the UN General Assembly (no votes to 0, with 20 abstentions)
(UN 1975,43-44,55-56), was vigorously opposed by the United States and
less publicly opposed by the Australian Whitlam Labor government. The
primary US concern was the zone's potential restriction of transit of
nuclear armed forces, both within territorial waters and on the high seas.
In the case of the Whitlam government, under considerable pressure from
the United States and embattled at the time with domestic controversy
over the raising of overseas loans, the primary concern was a wish to
avoid electorally damaging controversy over the impact of the SPNFZ on
ANZUS and Australia-United States relations (Walsh and Munster 1980,
127-133). Following the late 1975 election of conservative governments in
both New Zealand and Australia, the initiative lapsed.
While the concept died at the official South Pacific Forum level, peace
movements and indigenous peoples' groups in many regional countries
continued to encourage their respective governments to establish a
regional nuclear-free zone. At successive international conferences in 1975,
1978, and 1980, convened by the international Nuclear Free and Indepen-
__ dent P~fific~_etwQ!l<jNFIP)-,the PeoRle's Charter for a Nuclear Free and
Independent Pacific was drafted and amended (NFIP 1980, 17-21). The
charter called for establishing a comprehensive nuclear-free zone, decolo-
nization of remaining territories, and recognition of indigenous peoples'
rights throughout the Pacific region.
The third wave of regional interest in the nuclear-free-zone concept
emerged in the late 1970S and early 1980s. Encouraged by the NFIP net-
work's campaign, several Melanesian governments, including Papua New
Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomons, together with the New Zealand
Labour party began to revive and actively promote the SPNFZ concept. In
August 1983, in the context of an upsurge in Australian domestic antinu-
clear sentiment and South Pacific-wide concern over international and
regional developments in the nuclear antis race, Australia's newly elected
Hawke Labor government officially proposed the SPNFZ initiative at the
annual South Pacific Forum, the meeting of heads of state of independent
or freely associated South Pacific countries. The proposal was endorsed at
the August 1984 Forum, negotiated in the ensuing year through a Forum
Working Group chaired by Australia, signed at the 1985 Forum meeting,
and, following ratification by eight member states (Australia, New
Zealand, Fiji, Western Samoa, Tuvalu, Kiribati, Niue, and the Cook
Islands), came into force in December 1986.
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AUSTRALIAN MOTIVATION FOR PURSUING THE INITIATIVE
The Australian SPNFZ initiative was more a reaction against than a con-
summation of earlier initiatives. The close alliance between Australia and
the United States and extensive Australian involvement in US nuclear stra-
tegies made Australia, even under a Labor government, a rather unlikely
evangelist for a regional nuclear-free zone concept that was actively
opposed by the United States. The paradox is even more acute in light of
the Hawke government's pledges, soon after Hawke came to office, of
"continuity in foreign policy," commitment to maintaining all existing
forms of Australian nuclear cooperation with the United States, and com-
mitment to continued uranium mining (CR 1983, 8(7): 216; AFAR, lun 1983,
268; Hamel-Green 1990, 55).
The apparent irony of the regional state with the closest links to a
nuclear power actively initiating a regional nuclear-free zone arrangement
can be explained. There is evidence that the Rarotonga Treaty was pri-
marily motivated by the Australian government's wish to protect US,
~~3-us, and Australian _!!ucle_~_p~licie~~_g~in~~m~re£()mp~hen~~~Aenu-=- _
clearization arrangements sought by the Melanesian Alliance states
(Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu), the New Zealand
Labour party, and domestic peace movements in Australia and New
Zealand. (For a fuller discussion of this interpretation of Australia's moti-
vation, see Hamel-Green 1989; and for a differing interpretation see Fry
1983,1985,1986,1987.) The particular US and Australian regional nuclear
interests and plans that would have been threatened by more comprehen-
sive denuclearization arrangements are more extensive than might be sup-
posed given the relative remoteness of the South Pacific from the main
arenas of superpower confrontation.
The American regional presence includes six broad categories of
nuclear activity: (I) permanent bases for nuclear armed forces and storage
of nuclear weapons (Guam); (2) frequent transit of nuclear-armed or
nuclear-capable naval and air forces across South Pacific waters on a vari-
ety of missions, including power projection into the Indian Ocean, South-
east Asia, and the North Pacific; antisubmarine warfare activities; and
deployment of long-range sea-launched cruise missiles for counterforce
purposes; (3) a complex network of nuclear-weapon-related communica-
tions, intelligence, command, control, navigation, and scientific bases in
Micronesia (Guam and Kwajalein), Australia, and New Zealand; (4) mis-
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sile, antisatellite, and strategic defense initiative (Star Wars) testing at
Kwajalein; (5) disposal of nuclear- and chemical-weapon hazardous
wastes (Marshall Islands, Johnston Island); and (6) involvement in a mili-
tary alliance with a regional state, Australia, through the ANZUS security
treaty, that could be invoked either to defend regional states with nuclear
weapons or to involve regional states in contributing to US nuclear-war
fighting activities outside the region. (Overviews of the US nuclear pres-
ence in the region may be found in Feeney and Tow 1982, 163-225; Arkin
and Fieldhouse 1985, II7-129, 214-249; and Hayes, Zarsky, and Bello
1986,145-267).
During the early 1980s, the United States was particularly concerned
about international or regional obstacles to the Reagan administration's
plans to modernize and expand its naval and strategic forces. The plans
were to: (I) expand the surface navy from 345 to 600 major combatant
vessels (thus a need for increased rest and recreation and refueling visits at
foreign ports); (2) deploy approximately 370 nuclear Tomahawk sea-laun-
ched cruise missiles on a variety of platforms in the Pacific fleets and simi-
__________~arly_eQ!liI:2--1l5~~_at ~am_~ith ~ir-Iaunched ---.9:uis~_'Pi_ssil~L'!!!_<! (3)
upgrade operations at Kwajalein Missile Testing Range to test new gener-
ations of missiles (MX, Trident II) and strategic defense initiative systems.
The United States' concern to ensure Australian and New Zealand accept-
ance of its views on the need for nuclear-capable ship visits and Toma-
hawk cruise-missile deployment was reflected in visits to Canberra and
Wellington in 1982 by Deputy Secretary of State Walter Stoessel and
Eugene Rostow, head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
(Pugh 1989, 127).
In the context of the close military and nuclear links between Australia
and the United States and the relatively high level of electoral support for
the ANZUS alliance in Australia, the new Australian Labor government
gave full support to these US views and was anxious to protect its own
economic nuclear interests in the form of uranium export.
AUSTRALIA'S PREEMPTION STRATEGY
The Australian government advanced a limited-scope, limited-domain
zone (excluding the Micronesian trust territory states) that was primarily
directed at channeling domestic and regional antinuclear sentiment
against third-party non-ANZUS nuclear activities in the form of French
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nuclear testing. It also exempted and legitimized all existing and contem-
plated US, ANZUS and Australian regional nuclear activities. In doing
these things, the Australian government sought to secure ANZUS nuclear
interests and preempt more comprehensive zone arrangements favored by
island states and domestic antinuclear constituencies in both Australia and
New Zealand.
The Australian government's preemption strategy was partially ac-
knowledged by the chief Australian negotiator (and chairman of the SPNFZ
Working Group), David Sadlier, when he told a visiting US Congressional
delegation in 1986 that:
Australia assumed a leadership role in the Forum in order to provide a rational
and responsible guide in developing the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone
Treaty. It feared that some of the more emotional nations might take a more
radical position in opposing French testing. The aim of Australia, according to
Mr Sadlier, was to channel the efforts of the Forum into a constructive pro-
gram. He believes this approach has been successful, as some of the nations
favored going much further than the treaty. (USASC 1986, 15)
Since the treaty provisions themselves included the strongest possible pro-
hibitions against French testing, and there was no record in the negotia-
tions of other Forum states seeking stronger provisions against French
nuclear programs, Sadlier's reference to other Forum countries taking "a
more radical position" can be interpreted as referring to only non-French
-presumably US and Australian-nuclear activities in the region.
When the Hawke government initiated the SPNFZ proposal (1983-1984),
it was acutely aware of a regional trend toward denuclearization. This
trend included such developments as the strongly antinuclear national and
regional policies of the New Zealand Labour party, whose electoral for-
tunes were discernibly recovering in the early eighties and which regained
power in July 1984; the emergence of newly independent Vanuatu as a
forceful island advocate of comprehensive denuclearization; Papua New
Guinea's adoption of a 1981 foreign policy proposing an islands-only
regional organization and SPNFZ; the 1981 antinuclear shift in Solomon
Islands foreign policy under Mamaloni resulting in Solomons' active pro-
motion of the regional SPNFZ concept; the 1979-1980 adoption by Belau of
a nuclear-free constitution banning both nuclear-weapon stationing and
transit within Belauan territory; the 1980 adoption by the Federated States
of Micronesia of a constitution containing antinuclear provisions; and the
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strong support of the island states for nuclear-free zone initiatives at the
United Nations during the late I970S and early I980s.
This antinuclear trend among island states, complementing a rapid
growth of antinuclear sentiment in Australia and New Zealand during the
same period (Camilleri 1987,102-128), was related to two circumstances.
First was the long-standing bitterness of island states about the adverse
health and social consequences of Western nuclear and missile-testing pro-
grams in the region, including the more than IS0 atmospheric tests in the
Pacific conducted by the United States, Britain, and France from 1945 to
1974 and the further underground testing conducted by France from 1975
onward. Second were the island states' concerns about nuclear transit,
bases, and infrastructure in the region, including concerns about becom-
ing nuclear targets and loss of sovereignty and independence resulting
from nuclear and allied powers wishing to maintain hegemony over the
region for strategic reasons. (For overviews of island states' responses to
nuclear issues in the region, see Van Dyke, Smith, and Siwatibau 1983, 37-
57; Firth 1987; Johnson 1984; Weisgall 1980, 74-98; Dibblin 1988; for
irJ.lpli~_~tiQn~fQ!~o~e_r~igll!Y~I!Q i~Aep~l!de!!<::~,_~ee_Firth_I9~9J _
A SPNFZ initiated by New Zealand under a Labour government or the
Melanesian Alliance states might have contained elements that would
have threatened US and ANZUS nuclear and strategic policies. Australia
would then have found itself under strong regional and domestic pressure
either to participate in a SPNFZ arrangement perceived as inimical to
ANZUS and Australian nuclear policies and likely to strain its alliance with
the United States or to stay out of any zone arrangement and risk loss of
regional influence and the establishment of a rival islands-only regional
organization. The latter development would have served to shift the
regional focus away from the traditional Western alignment of regional
organizations toward more independent regional security policies. Either
alternative was unpalatable from the perspective of the long-term protec-
tion of US and Australian strategic and nuclear policies in the region.
ISLAND STATES' RESPONSES TO AUSTRALIA'S SPNFZ INITIATIVE
Island states' responses to the treaty, disclosed in the Australian chair-
man's official record of the negotiations (SPF 1985) and in public comments
by island leaders before and after the treaty was signed, reveal considera-
ble ambivalence about its content. Despite this ambivalence, all the Forum
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island states, except Vanuatu and Tonga, eventually signed and ratified
the treaty. Even Vanuatu, the most antinuclear and anticolonial of the
Melanesian states, though unwilling to sign the treaty, did not actively
pursue an islands-only comprehensive zone arrangement. Acceptance by
most of the island states of the partial and selective denuclearization
arrangements embodied in the Rarotonga Treaty may be attributed to
four principal factors: (I) the perceived modest arms-control gains offered
by the treaty in relation to long-standing island nuclear concerns; (2) Aus-
tralia's negotiating strategy of promising US support for the treaty if com-
promises were accepted (as it happened, US endorsement was not forth-
coming); (3) the widespread economic dependence of island states on
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; and (4) close defense link-
ages between some island states and the ANZUS states.
INITIAL SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM RESPONSES
From the inception in I97I of the South Pacific Forum, its member states
........ _.t2~1<~_S~!()~gc2!1~c_tiv~~t~11~a.ga.i.l!stFr~nE~~~~t!~g~I1c!r~p~at~~lL<:£lll~~_
for an end to the testing. This issue and wider concern over potential
regional involvement in superpower nuclear conflicts first led the Forum
states to support the New Zealand Labour government's I975 proposal to
establish a regional SPNFZ (AFAR I975, 406). This early Forum consensus
on the desirability of establishing a SPNFZ did not reach the stage of
detailed negotiation and drafting since the conservative governments that
came to office in both New Zealand and Australia at the end of I975
opposed implementation of the concept on the grounds that it was
"impractical" and likely to adversely affect ANZUS obligations. While Fiji,
Western Samoa, and Papua New Guinea indicated at the March I976
Forum meeting that they wished to proceed with negotiations, the island
states were bound by the Forum consensus principle and therefore could
not proceed in the absence of support from Australia and New Zealand.
Over the next six years, the Forum states did not collectively pursue the
concept of a regional nuclear-free zone, although the Melanesian mem-
bers individually continued to promote the idea. The Forum did, how-
ever, from I979 onward, become concerned with the additional nuclear
issue of regional waste dumping as a collective response to both Japanese
and American plans for nuclear waste dumping in the region. Forum com-
muniques from I979 on strongly condemned both waste storage and
ocean waste dumping in the region (AFAR, I983, 7-II , 409; I984, 799).
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When Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke first proposed the new
SPNFZ proposal at the 1983 Forum meeting, he sought a draft declaration
of a SPNFZ that would prohibit the acquisition, testing, receipt, storage,
stationing, and control of nuclear weapons in the region but permit transit
of nuclear weapons in international territory and territorial transit and
port calls at the discretion of individual governments (ADFA 1983, II-I2).
He argued that the language of the 1975 SPNFZ proposal was "considered
by some to be too rigid and was seen as being in conflict with commit-
ments under ANZUS" and that Australia believed that unless its allies could
rely on port access, there would be "little enthusiasm for the [SPNFZ]
treaty" (SPF 1983). The proposed declaration would pave the way for a
Tlatelolco-type treaty that "could be taken up in the U.N. [and] provide a
rallying point for opposition to French testing" (ADFA 1983, II-I2). Aus-
tralia further emphasized that it did not envisage the zone as seeking to
regulate uranium mining and export or commercial nuclear-power gener-
ation (ibid). The Australian initiative sought to insulate both ANZUS and
Australian nuclear interests from the scope of the SPNFZ proposal while
_ b9JdiIlg__Qut-.!Q_i~J~!!cl_~~,!!es J:h~_P!~p~c:_~s _9LAIl!~~~_~!1_b_~Cki~&f.c:>r _t~~____ _
zone and a more forceful campaign against French nuclear testing, partic-
ularly at the UN.
The island states responded cautiously and, in some cases, critically to
the proposal. Several of the Melanesian states, together with the Cook
Islands, criticized the proposal for not going far enough; others, notably
Fiji and Tonga, supported the Australian concept of permitting transit.
However, Australia was successful in securing Forum willingness to
reconsider the idea the following year.
One year later, at the August 1984 Forum meeting at Tuvalu, Australia
resubmitted its SPNFZ proposal in amended form. This time Australia was
successful in gaining Forum agreement to establish a Working, Group,
chaired by Australia, to negotiate a treaty based on the Australian pro-
posal. The Forum meeting, which included the newly elected Labour
prime minister of New Zealand, David Lange, endorsed seven principles
advanced by Australia. These principles, adopted as guidelines by the
Forum SPNFZ Working Group, embodied opposition to some of the
unpopular nuclear activities in the region, such as testing, stationing, and
environmental contamination, but not to others, such as missile testing.
The principles sought, through insistence on sovereign rights to permit or
deny port access for foreign vessels, to protect current and future nuclear-
weapons transit in the region (AFAR 1984, 800).
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While the Melanesian states continued to press for more comprehensive
zone arrangements, the New Zealand Labour government, despite its dis-
pute with the United States about refusing to accept nuclear-ship visits and
its generally strong antinuclear stance, sided with the limited-scope Austra-
lian SPNFZ initiative. To avoid further repercussions from either of its ANZUS
partners, the Lange Labour government was anxious to reassure both the
United States and Australia that it was not seeking to "export" its "nuclear
allergy" to the rest of the South Pacific region (Hamel-Green 1990, 72-81).
The mutually reinforcing support of Australia and New Zealand and
their success in winning over the support of Polynesian states and Fiji were
sufficient to gain agreement from the more reluctant Melanesian and
Micronesian Forum members to the idea of immediately proceeding with
regional Forum negotiations for the SPNFZ proposal. Melanesian support
for immediate negotiations on the basis of the Australian SPNFZ guidelines
took place in the context of the simultaneously advanced Australian offer
of patrol boats to help island states police their exclusive economic zones.
This offer created considerable inducement, over and above Australia's
no~~~La~~_pr?~r~~IIl_s~!~r_e~p_o~~~!<:>Aus!ra!i~n!egi<:>I!alA~pl()J!l<1_cy.
Following the 1984 Tuvalu Forum's agreement to set up a SPNFZ Work-
ing Group chaired by Australia, there was a series of four Working Group
meetings between November 1984 and May 1985 to develop a draft treaty.
ISLAND STATES' RESPONSES DURING TREATY
NEGOTIATIONS 1984-1985
The official record of the negotiations reveals that the Melanesian Alli-
ance states had serious misgivings about the limitations of Australia's zone
proposal. This was consistent with the strong emphasis on regional denu-
clearization evident in the three states' policies from the time they gained
independence.
As early as 1974, Papua New Guinea's (PNG) first foreign minister,
Albert Maori Kiki, strongly supported zones of peace and neutrality in the
Pacific. In 1975, PNG cosponsored the New Zealand motion at the UN
General Assembly for establishment of a SPNFZ; and in 1981, PNG's For-
eign Policy White Paper recommended that PNG "seek to have the islands
region declared a nuclear-weapons-free zone" and proposed that a new
regional organization of Pacific island states with control over their own
foreign policy be established to negotiate a regional nuclear-free zone
illJiidi"nJ:Uiii4LlIWiiLW&ltiZGillL
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treaty and other agreements aimed at excluding rivalries between external
powers within the region (PNGFAR 1982, 37-38, 79). Specific PNG policies
included the protection of the regional environment from the effects of
nuclear testing and nuclear waste dumping and refusal to host foreign
bases with actual or potential military use since these could make PNG a
target in a conflict that did not directly involve it. During the early 1980s,
PNG continued to actively promote the SPNFZ in international forums,
had a restrictive (though not totally excluding) policy on nuclear-armed
ship visits, and refused US requests for 852 overflights originating from
Guam.
In the Solomons, the Mamaloni government of 1981 similarly took a
strong stance of supporting regional denuclearization and nuclear-free
zones. The more conservative 1984 Kenilorea government, after initially
accepting a controversial US ship visit that stimulated sharp protests from
Solomons' peace movement, church, and union members, adopted a con-
sistent antinuclear stance of prohibiting nuclear-ship visits and supporting
a comprehensive nuclear-free zone.
____Va~uatu, independent from 1980, was the most vocal of the Melanesian
states i;; p~;sui~g-;-egio~;}c:le~~~kari~~tionpolici~s.-At -the 198i-South
Pacific Conference, Prime Minister Walter Lini argued:
It is a matter of life and death that our Pacific ocean be declared a nuclear-free
zone. Testing of any kind must be outlawed, as must the dumping of nuclear
waste, the firing of nuclear devices and the passage of submarines or overflying
aircraft carrying them. (Sope 1982, I)
In both regional forums and the United Nations, Vanuatu representatives
repeatedly emphasized the need for a nuclear-free zone that would go
beyond testing and dumping to ban nuclear transit and called for opposi-
tion to all forms of "nuclear colonialism" (Robie 1986, vii-viii).
In the treaty negotiations, the Melanesian alliance states showed partic-
ular concern about loopholes in six areas: (I) nuclear-weapons transit and
de facto stationing; (2) missile testing; (3) zone boundaries; (4) nuclear-
waste dumping; (5) uranium export to nuclear-weapon states; and (6) lack
of comprehensiveness.
Nuclear- Weapons Transit and De Facto Stationing
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu voiced strong concerns that the treaty's
lack of regulation of port visits by nuclear-armed vessels could lead
&mJLLW,LiUiili£1lil:a
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to some form of de facto stationing. The two states proposed that the
treaty impose time limits on the "duration and pattern of port visits"
(SPEC 1985, 16). Despite Australia's rejection of this proposal, PNG noted
its "continued interest in the duration of ship visits" and sought
a "prior warning" requirement for nuclear-ship visits. The issue of
de facto stationing is by no means a remote possibility: in 1981, for
example, one analyst estimated that there were US nuclear-powered and
nuclear-armed attack submarines visiting Stirling Naval Base in West-
ern Australia some twenty to twenty-five percent of the time (Ball
1983, ISS)·
Missile Testing
Island states have frequently voiced concerns about US, Soviet, and Chi-
nese missile testing in the Pacific and, more specifically, about the eco-
nomic and social plight of Marshall Islanders displaced from their home
islands to make way for the US missile range at Kwajalein. In accord with
these concerns, PNG, the Solomons, Vanuatu, and Nauru all expressed
concern that the treaty did not seek to ban missile testing in the region(sPE-C-i 9-SS;-27):-- -- -- ------ ------------------ ----- -
Zone Boundaries
Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu challenged the idea that the northern
boundaries of the treaty be fixed at the equator, thereby excluding the
three Micronesian states (Belau, Federated States of Micronesia, and
Marshall Islands) despite their eligibility for becoming full members of
the South Pacific Forum (FSM and the Marshalls subsequently became
full members). From the PNG and Vanuatu point of view, there was
no reason for excluding island states that were already directly linked
to the South Pacific through the South Pacific Commission and in the
process of forging closer links with the Forum itself; PNG expressed
its "continued preference" for the treaty to be based on the South Pa-
cific Commission boundaries (SPEC 1985, 10). The most likely expla-
nation for Australia's wish to exclude the former trust territory states
was to avoid conflict with the United States since the antistationing
provisions of the Rarotonga Treaty might have come into direct con-
flict with US efforts to retain nuclear-weapons storage and basing rights
under its Compact of Free Association agreements with these states
(Hamel-Green 1990, 44-46).
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Nuclear- Waste Dumping
Papua New Guinea and the Solomons were concerned that the antidump-
ing provisions of the treaty did not extend to external potential dumpers,
such as Japan, and proposed a fourth protocol to the treaty that would
"invite potential dumpers to undertake commitments against dumping in
the zone" (SPEC 1985, 19). This proposal was rejected by Australia on the
grounds that it would prejudice a successful outcome to the South Pacific
Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) negotiations on a regional
environmental convention. As it happened, the regional convention did
not include Japan among its signatories.
Uranium Exports to Nuclear- Weapon States
Vanuatu sought a prohibition on transfers of nuclear materials under safe-
guards to nuclear-weapon states (SPEC 1985, 27). While the island states
appeared to accept the safeguarded export of nuclear materials to nonnu-
clear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they questioned
whether there was any similar obligation to nuclear-weapon states, partic-
-- -lillI-Iy In -vIew-oJ the pOSSIbility that- safeguards m-ightnot be adequate -to
prevent nuclear-weapon states diverting nuclear materials to their nuclear-
weapons programs.
Lack of Comprehensiveness
Both the Solomons and Vanuatu strongly attacked the lack of comprehen-
siveness in die treaty. At a press conference at the 1985 Rarotonga South
Pacific Forum meeting, Vanuatu's Prime Minister Walter Lini argued that
the treaty would not be effective in keeping out the nuclear powers,
including the French, the Russians, and the Americans; was too selective
in including New Caledonia and Wallis and Futuna but not the American
territories in Micronesia; was ineffective in controlling waste dumping
since it did not cover territorial waters; should have included bans on
nuclear-weapon delivery systems and uranium mining; and failed to con-
sider the wishes of island peoples in keeping the region free of nuclear
threats (Hamel-Green 1990, 92). The treaty would mean "a failure to
achieve a comprehensive nuclear free zone."
Lini further noted that the Forum's consensus mode of operation had
been abused to arrive at endorsement of the treaty: "We were sorry to see
that consensus is sometimes used to get something that only some mem-
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bers of the Forum want." Although Vanuatu did not rule out signing the
treaty later, its policy was to broaden the zone's scope and boundaries. "It
is the governments of the South Pacific that have difficulty in signing a
comprehensive nuclear-free Pacific treaty, not the people," Lini empha-
sized later in a documentary film on the issue (PIM, Jan 1989, 17).
ATTITUDES OF FIJI AND THE POLYNESIAN STATES
By contrast with the Melanesian Alliance states, Fiji under the Mara gov-
ernment and the Polynesian members of the South Pacific Forum (with the
exception of Tonga) did not publicly criticize or express reservations
about the limited nature of the SPNFZ treaty.
While Fiji was a strong supporter of the New Zealand 1975 SPNFZ initia-
tive and adopted a policy of excluding nuclear-ship visits in the late 1970s,
the 1980-1983 Mara government's shift toward closer alignment with the
United States, culminating in the 1983 formal decision to accept US
nuclear-ship visits, meant that the Fiji government shared much the same
p~~c~tio~~s_~~~~_~str_~i~~_g~\,~!"n"!~!!!_~~__~~~ E~~~_~o li"!it the s£~p_~_oJ
the zone. Ratu Mara even warned at the 1984 South Pacific Forum that
Fiji would not sign the treaty if it imposed bans on nuclear-warship visits
(SPEC 1984).
However, the Mara government's view of the treaty did not necessarily
reflect a consensus within Fiji. The policies of the brief one-month Bava-
dra government before the May 1987 military coup suggested that many
Fijians shared the same ambivalence toward the treaty as the Melanesian
Alliance states. Dr Bavadra criticized the Mara government for signing the
Rarotonga Treaty and said that a Fiji Labour government would with-
draw from the treaty and fight for a stronger one:
The Fiji government, regrettably, has already signed and ratified the existing
Treaty. On the one hand, it professes to support the concept of a nuclear-free
Pacific but, on the other, it signs a treaty which it knows falls far short of that
ideal. (FS, 6 Aug 1986)
In Bavadra's view, the treaty was a "useless document" for preventing
nuclear activities in the region, and the escape clauses included in the pro-
tocols were a "farce" (STF, 10 Aug 1986).
The antinuclear stance of the Bavadra government might have been one
of the factors that led to the May 1987 military coup. The coup leader,
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Colonel Rabuka, cited as one of the reasons for mounting the coup a con-
cern that the Bavadra government's ban on nuclear ships and its policy of
nonalignment would "harm the interests of major allies, notably the
United States" (Sanday I988, 34). A recent study of the ANZUS nuclear-
ships crisis similarly notes that this was a factor in the coup and that "the
prospect of a nuclear visit ban in Fiji added to alarm in Washington and
Hawaii about naval visits in the South Pacific" (Pugh I989, I6S). Such a US
reaction is consistent with circumstantial evidence of US collusion with
the coup leaders (ibid).
While most of the Polynesian members of the South Pacific Forum,
including the Cook Islands, Western Samoa, Tuvalu, and Niue, generally
supported Australia's limited SPNFZ concept, the conservative monarchic
government of Tonga considered that the zone went too far rather than
not far enough. Following a brief, well-publicized flirtation with the idea
of seeking Soviet economic aid, Tonga received substantial increases in
economic and military aid from the ANZUS states during the late I970S and
early I98os. In I978, Tonga became the first independent Pacific Island
state to accept visits by nuclear warships. While supporting moves against
nuclear tes-ting and waste dumping, Tonga took exception to the anti-
storage and antistationing provisions of the Rarotonga Treaty (SPEC
I983). In the Tongan government's view, the United States should have the
right to store and station nuclear weapons in South Pacific countries, espe-
cially in wartime.
FACTORS IN SECURING ISLAND SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY
Despite the strong reservations expressed by the Melanesian states, Aus-
tralia succeeded in eventually securing the signature of almost all the eligi-
ble Forum states, only Vanuatu and Tonga not having signed as of June
I989. Further, the island states did not move to negotiate a more compre-
hensive arrangement, as either an alternative or a complement to the
Rarotonga Treaty. The treaty, while obviously not to the satisfaction of
the Melanesian states, successfully preempted the possibility of an alliance
between the island states and New Zealand, or the formation of an
islands-only organization, that might have negotiated more comprehen-
sive denuclearization arrangements, options that the island states seemed
to be moving toward in the early I98os.
Island support for the treaty cannot be explained by simply assuming
74 THE CONTEMPORARY PACIFIC· SPRING 1991
that island states share the same security perceptions and priorities as the
ANZUS states. Even allowing for the traditionally pro-Western alignment
of most of the island states, particularly the Polynesian states, island states
see regional security priorities in very different terms from the ANZUS
states.
Rather than viewing the principal threat to regional security as an
external military threat by a major power such as the Soviet Union, the
island states perceive the greatest threat to be economic insecurity, as was
evident at the 1984 Wellington colloquium on the special problems of
small island states. Economic vulnerability is usually seen as arising from
the small size and scale of island economies, transportation costs and
problems associated with remoteness, dependence on a limited range of
primary industries (most frequently coconut products, fishing, and miner-
als), limited natural resources (particularly in the Polynesian and
Micronesian islands), and rising expectations of increases in living stan-
dards (PIM, Oct 1987, 37).
Similarly, the PNG prime minister (and former foreign minister), Rab-
bie Namaliu, assessed the threat of unprovoked attack on an island coun-
try-hy-an-exter-nal power as ''SIlg-ht,''but-no-tedthatthe--th~eat-ofd~stabili-
zation of an island state for "profit or ideology," possibly associated with
great-power rivalry, was "more likely" and that the most likely threats lay
in "domestic instability in New Caledonia" and "domestic internal threats
to individual states" (AFAR 1983, 417). Namaliu's reference to destabiliza-
tion associated with great-power rivalry was concerned not only with
potential Soviet activities but also with potential economic, political, and
military activities of Western governments or business interests. The US
invasion of Grenada and the establishment of rapid deployment forces in
all three ANZUS states did not inspire confidence in the Western camp on
the part of island states.
Island countries do not necessarily share the ANZUS states' fears about
the Soviet Union exploiting commercial relations with island states as
the thin end of the wedge to a Soviet military presence ashore. Rather,
both Melanesian and Micronesian states-including Vanuatu, Solo-
mons, and Kiribati-view fishing agreements and other commercial rela-
tions with the Soviet Union as a means of becoming more self-reliant
economically. As the former PNG foreign secretary, Tony Siaguru, com-
mented:
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Pacific Island leaders are certainly sufficiently aware of the dangers of allowing
Russia a political toehold in their countries to take the necessary preventative
measures. But it would be hard for anyone to deny that the presence of the
Russians has brought and continues to bring, directly and vicariously, much
economic benefit to the impoverished Pacific Island states. Even if Russia is
paying over the market price for facilities, we stand a little taller with this form
of aid than we do with the usual tied hand-outs. (PIM, May 1987, 18)
The argument that the SPNFZ must permit US nuclear-weapons transit
in the region as a "counter" to the Soviet military threat regionally and
globally seemed somewhat remote from the island states' own assessment
of the security threats facing them and even counterproductive given the
possibility of provoking great-power military rivalry in the region. Island
states' support for or acquiescence in the treaty and reluctance to negotiate
a more comprehensive islands-only treaty were more plausibly the out-
come of a combination of incentives and constraints. These derived not
only from island states' common nuclear concerns but also from their eco-
nomic dependence and vulnerability.
The first incentive was the promised potential of the zone for putting
- --- -- --- -- - - - -- - -_. -
pressure on France to cease testing in the region-a long-standing concern
of all island states. This incentive was accentuated by Australia's implicit
assurance that the United States would support the treaty-a significant
diplomatic development that would have added to international pressure
on France to relocate its Pacific testing program. As Vanuatu's Father
Walter Lini noted, Australia "quite confidently predicted [at the 1984
Tuvalu Forum meeting], that America would sign the treaty [protocols]"
(ABCSBS 1989). In the absence of comprehensive denuclearization, the
treaty continued to have relevance to island states as a modest move
toward putting renewed pressure on France to end testing in the region.
The second incentive lay in new forms and levels of economic and mili-
tary assistance offered by the ANZUS states when the treaty was initiated
and negotiated. While not directly linked to the treaty in terms of their
objectives, these new aid and assistance programs seemed to promote a
positive climate for island responses to Australia's initiative. The most
salient of these new forms of assistance was the Australian Pacific Patrol
Boat initiative. This was taken advantage of by all the Melanesian Alli-
ance states, as well as Fiji, Western Samoa, and the Cook Islands. With
the exception of Australian assistance for PNG's recurrent government
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expenditure, ANZUS economic and military assistance to island states con-
tinued to rise in the early and mid-1980s. Australian defense assistance to
PNG, for example, rose from A$q million per year in 1975 to nearly A$17
million per year in 1983 (ASSCFAD 1984, 1°4-1°5). Also, new aid, trade,
and military cooperation relationships were established between the
United States and a number of island countries, especially Fiji and PNG
(Hamel-Green 1990, 86-98).
In Fiji, confirmation of the role of US economic incentives in the Fijian
reversal of its previous ban on nuclear-ship visits was evident in state-
ments made during Ratu Mara's visit to Washington in November 1984.
During the visit, Ratu Mara sought increases in American military and
economic aid, including the provision of US bilateral aid, arguing that Fiji
was ready to play its part in regional security and that US development aid
was part of the overall US responsibility to the region (FT, 29 Nov 1984).
President Reagan thanked Fiji for weighing its opposition to nuclear
weapons against the security needs of the region to give US naval ships
access to Fiji ports, and US officials indicated that Fiji would receive a
major boost in US aid (ibid).
-Tlils-promlse was -quickly tulfille(F by- 1986, US economIc -aid to Fiji
increased to approximately US$1.5 million annually, a threefold increase
over the 1980 level. Charles Greenleaf, US assistant administrator in the
Bureau for Asia and the Near East, noted that "our program delivers on
the President's commitment to Prime Minister Ratu Mara in November
1984 and is int~nded to maintain Fiji's role as a moderate and influential
pro-US force in the South Pacific" (USASC 1986, 568). In addition to
increased economic aid, the United States substantially increased its mili-
tary cooperation with Fiji, including providing training programs for
Fijian military personnel and funding assistance for equipping the Fijian
army with a new standard rifle, the us M16A2 (Herr 1984, 186-187; Alves
1985,3-4; Sutherland 1988 , 41).
Along with these incentives to island support for the treaty were nega-
tive constraints affecting the freedom of island states to pursue more com-
prehensive NFZ arrangements. First, at the economic level, the heavy
dependence of the island states on ANZUS aid, trade, and military assis-
tance, particularly from Australia and New Zealand, meant that the
island states would have been subject to possible reductions in anticipated
economic assistance or even to economic sanctions. US withdrawal from
military cooperation arrangements with New Zealand, coupled with open
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discussion of economic sanctions against New Zealand by US Congres-
sional representatives, would have been interpreted by many island gov-
ernments as an indication of what they, too, could face if they were to pur-
sue comprehensive NFZ arrangements.
Second, at the political level, island states were likely constrained by a
perceived threat of political destabilization. As already noted, Namaliu
regarded the threat of destabilization arising from great-power rivalry as a
moderately likely threat. The hypothesized role of the United States in the
first Fiji coup is one possible example. Another is Belau, where the United
States is believed to have colluded in campaigns aimed at intimidating sup-
porters of Belau's nuclear-free constitution (Firth 1987, 57-64; Greco 1987,
22-25). These examples suggest that island perceptions of possible desta-
bilization instigated directly or indirectly by a superpower constrained the
Forum island states from pursuing more comprehensive denuclearization.
CONCLUSION: REGIONAL CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
In_t~e relatively brief period since the 1~85 signing of the SPNFZ Treaty, any
conclusions concerning the regional consequences and implications must
necessarily be very tentative. In the short term, it may have achieved its
immediate objective of protecting major developments in American strate-
gic utilization of the region, particularly the new deployment of long-
range cruise missiles and the upgrading of C3I installations for new strate-
gic missions (nuclear-war fighting, sm), against the possibility of a more
comprehensive regional denuclearization. In achieving this objective, the
Australian government successfully asserted its traditional ascendancy
over regional security policy, in part through a negotiating strategy that
held out the prospect of US support for the measure and in part through
the push-pull inducements inherent in the island states' economic depen-
dence on the ANZUS states.
The regional threat to US and ANZUS nuclear interests posed by New
Zealand Labour's antinuclear stance, while an important element of the
regional pressure for denuclearization that prompted Australia's preemp-
tive SPNFZ initiative, was successfully contained by the treaty. The New
Zealand Labour government was reluctant to risk additional US or Aus-
tralian sanctions by encouraging the "export" of its "nuclear allergy" to
the remainder of the region and therefore did not support island states'
efforts to secure more comprehensive denuclearization during treaty nego-
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tiations. In the short term, at least, the Rarotonga Treaty served to pre-
vent the New Zealand "disease" from becoming a regional epidemic.
The treaty has so far not achieved its ostensible aims of ending French
testing and protecting the region from nuclear attack. France has contin-
ued to declare its intention to test in the Pacific (PIM, June 1987, 12). On
the other hand, the treaty has served as a means of applying diplomatic
pressure on France through UN General Assembly resolutions calling on it
to sign and ratify the treaty protocols. In the context of the eased East-
West tensions in Europe and the prospect of further European arms con-
trol, both internal and external pressures on France to scale down its
nuclear effort may yet lead to an end to the French nuclear test program in
the Pacific.
The treaty's tolerance of the continued regional presence of US nuclear-
weapon systems likely to attract targeting suggests that superpower
nuclear competition and the risk of nuclear attack have by no means been
eliminated. The zone has not removed any of the principal risk factors
likely to attract or provoke nuclear attack.
}f t~~_Austr~li~ngove~nm~ntwas~~ce~sful in it~ g()~Lofp~o_tectiIlg_US
and ANZUS nuclear and strategic objectives in the region, at least in the
short term, this success was not without significant political costs. In the
longer term, these costs could defeat the original aims of the exercise. The
US decision against endorsing the treaty caused major resentment and bit-
terness throughout most of the island states against both the United States
and Australia. Having agreed to treaty compromises to accommodate
ANZUS nuclear concerns in the belief that the treaty would be backed by
the United States and thereby add to international pressure against French
testing, island states understandably felt betrayed by the ANZUS states,
including New Zealand.
The United States was again seen (as in its 1983 decision not to sign the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and its failure to
restrain its fishing fleet from illegal fishing in island waters) to be insensi-
tive to even the most elementary regional aspirations for protection of
South Pacific peoples' health, security, resources, and environment. Aus-
tralia was seen either as manipulating island consent to an arrangement
that did not effectively exclude superpower nuclear rivalry and activities
in the region or as having less power than it purported in securing its pow-
erful ally's recognition of regional interests.
Summarizing island states' perceptions of the US decision not to sign
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the treaty protocols, PNG's Siaguru noted that island leaders were
"abruptly dumped back to square one by the US's refusal to sign the proto-
cols of the Treaty of Rarotonga," and "complained bitterly" of American
inconsistency in negotiating the fishing agreement and then rejecting the
Rarotonga protocols (PIM, May 1987,15-18). A recent report on the South
Pacific by the conservative American-based Pacific Forum organization
similarly noted the "deep disappointment" and "resentment" in the region
over the American decision on the protocols and island perceptions that
the United States appeared to tilt toward France on nuclear and territorial
issues using as an excuse its global interests (PNGT, 24-30 Sep 1987).
These negative island reactions to the US nonsignature of the protocols
may well be dissipated by diplomatic initiatives and increases in American
and Australian economic assistance to the region. On the other hand, the
insensitive US response to the treaty could contribute to a reorientation in
island states' relations with the ANZUS states. It may well reinforce the
trend among some island states, especially the Melanesian states, to seek
to reduce their economic and political dependence on the ANZUS states by
diversjfying their relations with othe~ countries, including Third World
countries, Japan, the European Economic Community, the Soviet Union,
and China. Already, Kiribati and Vanuatu have entered into commercial
fishing agreements with the Soviet Union, Nauru is considering a Soviet
offer of assistance in rehabilitation of the island following exhaustion of
phosphate deposits, and PNG has sought membership of the Association
of South East Asian Nations. If the ANZUS states cannot be counted on to
protect island interests, then regional states may turn to more responsive
alignments.
The ANZUS stress on the Soviet military threat to the region, not neces-
sarily shared by many island states, especially in Melanesia, grows daily
less credible as East-West tensions subside and the Soviet Union imple-
ments significant military cutbacks in both Europe and the Pacific.
According to Siaguru, when the United States withdrew its security guar-
antees from New Zealand as a result of the nuclear-ships ban, island states
observed that
the Russians did not leap into the breach. New Zealand was not bombed....
The months passed and New Zealand still existed carefree enough outside the
American umbrella without any devastating consequences for itself or the
Region." (PIM, May 1987, 18)
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Given this difference in perception of the salience of external and Soviet
threats, in Siaguru's view,
unless the US can demonstrate that its policy in the South West Pacific is not
simply residual to its global strategic concerns, then as the situation clarifies
with time the appeal of some form of internationally sanctioned regional neu-
trality is going to grow. (PIM, May 1987, 18)
Continued US unwillingness to endorse the treaty may contribute to a les-
sening of Australian and American influence in the region and work
against the ANZUS objective of preserving the pro-Western alignment of
the region.
The Rarotonga Treaty and its Protocol 2 obligations meant that the
Soviet Union and China did not need to make onerous strategic conces-
sions. Their prompt signature and declaratory support for the SPNFZ con-
cept have already helped improve their relations with island states. The
treaty provided a unique opportunity for the Soviet Union, which has long
lacked residential diplomatic missions in island states, to show its sensitiv-
ity to island nuclear concerns and contrast its regional and arms-control
policies with those onts superpower rival. Sovlei:success in negotiaring .
two fishing agreements with island states, Kiribati and Vanuatu, and sup-
port for the Rarotonga Treaty could be expected to further reduce former
island hesitations in opening up diplomatic and commercial relations with
the Soviet Union. PNG's recent agreement "in principle" to a Soviet
request for an embassy in Port Moresby may well be symptomatic of a
new Soviet credibility in the region arising in part from Soviet gestures of
support for island states' arms-control aspirations-the first fruits of
glasnost in the South Pacific (Age, 17 Feb 1989).
The regional backlash against the United States was so severe that both
the American business-oriented Pacific Forum organization and the House
of Representatives subsequently urged the administration to change its
mind about signing the treaty (PNGT, 24-30 Sep 1987; USSAPA 1987).
These domestic US political pressures may well lead to American recon-
sideration of the costs and benefits of withholding ratification. American
ratification of the Rarotonga Protocols would eliminate the present ten-
sion between Australia's pursuit of "enlightened ANZUS self-interest" at the
regional level and the continuing American subordination of regional con-
cerns to US global strategies and priorities.
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